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Abstract
This paper examines U.S. policymakers' use of historical memory in the decision-making
process during three moments characteized by high tension: the U.S. response to the
North's invasion of South Korea in 1950, the U.S.S. Pueblo crisis of 1968, and the
successive nuclear standoffs of 1993-1994 and 2002-2003. Using government records
and interviews with U.S. officials, I demonstrate how diverse "lessons of history" help
constrain the formulation and implementation of some policy options while enabling
others by shaping (1) the diplomatic and military options presented to policymakers, (2)
policymakers' responses to setbacks on the ground, and (3) the extent of U.S.
involvement. I suggest that historical memory is a constitutive part of the decision-
making environment and a significant part of the internal setting of the decision-making
process. I also conclude that the selective use of historical memory (analogical
reasoning) in the process outlined above is more acute in time of crisis. In these
situations, the decision period is shorter; the search for information is less thorough than
during the normal course of events; the degree of urgency is high; and the decisions may
be irrevocable. Because accurate intelligence on North Korean intentions has been a
serious problem dating back to the Second World War, U.S. policyrnakers have been
obliged to rely on other their cognizance of past North Korean behavior in order to derive
policy options and make decisions. If we suppose that policymakers sometimes
unconsciously reach for "lessons of history" when confronting situations in which
"objective" information is scarce, then the Korea conflict, with all its uncertainties, ought
to afford us a way of testing out this assumption.
I.
il.
Introduction
Literature Review
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Interdisciplinary Theory 4
Historiography of the Korean Conflict 8
m. A Note on Methodology l0
IV. Starting and Ending the Korean War 13
Prior to the Outbreak of Hostilities 14
Deciding to Intervene - The Power of Munich 15
Dealing with Setbacks 20
The Decision to Nesotiate 24
Rhetoric and the Korean War 26
V. The U.S.S. Pueblo Crisis 28
North Korea before the Pueblo 28
Tonkin Gulf...or Cuba? 30
VI. Two Nuclear Crises: Competing Analogies 39
1993: How to Respond? 40
The 1994 Agreed Framework Talks 44
The 1994 "Bobbv Hall Incident" 45
The Bush Administration: Learnine the "Lessons" Of 1994 48
VII. Conclusion 49
A Last Word on Rationalitv 53
VIII. Bibliography 55
I
4
McKay: U.S. Decision-making in the Korean Conflict
I.INTRODUCTIONI
"Our action in Korea reflected...a recognition that aggression of any sort must be met
early and head-on or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had re-
learned the lessons of the 1930's - Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia."
- U.^S. Department of State Bulletin,February 19652
If the U.S. imperialists ignite another Korean war, oblivious of lessons of history, the
Korean people including school, youth and children will mercilessly punish them with
resentment and hatred that have been pent up for half a century.
- Korean Central News Agency,June 20013
Presidents and their advisors vary greatly in their intellectual formations. Some have been
derided as "naive historians" - Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson - while others hail
from academia itself - Woodrow Wilson and Henry Kissinger.a One of the common
denominators among them is their use of history to frame and justify policy decisions. If
policymakers imagine that history repeats or replicates itsell it may be because they are
practical-intuitive historians who reinforce their perceptions of world events by
"learning" from "lessons of history." As the epigraphs above suggest, historical memory
t The impetus behind this paper came during a summer spent interning in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Negotiations Policy). What struck me most when listening to top policymakers debate the
options before them was the prominence of historical "lessons" in informing and justifying decisions. I
am especially grateful to Professor Emily S. Rosenberg, my thesis advisor, and to my former supervisor,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Guy Robert R. Roberts, for his candid remarks on both current
U.S. policy and the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations. Numerous other former and current U.S.
officials provided color and context to my analysis through oral, written, and telephone interviews.
Thank you also to Professors Andrew A. Latham and Paul D. Solon for reading and commenting on early
drafts.
2 Department of State Bulletin,8 February 1965,p. 17l.
' Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 2001. <www.kcna.cojp/item/2001/200106/news06/23.htm>.
a Vertzberger, Yaacov. "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied History
and Its Shortcomings." International Studies Quarterly 30, 2 (1986): 223-247. p.224.
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might provide a useful tool in examining decision-making because it colors the way
policymakers assess risk, predict success, view current developments, and justify their
actions rhetorically.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of analogical reasoning at the highest
levels of the U.S. foreign policy establishment on policy formulation and implementation
in Korea during three distinct historical moments: (1) the Korean War, 1950-53, (2) the
1968 U.S.S. Pueblo crisis, and (3) the nuclear crises of 1993-1994 and 2002-2003. In
each instance, I will make the case that top U.S. policymakers' intuitive use of historical
analogy constrained some policy options and enabled others, affecting (1) the diplomatic
and military options presented to them, (2) their response to setbacks on the ground, and
(3) the extent of U.S. involvement.
Although the use of history has been adequately criticized as an effective basis for sound
foreign-policy making,s it remains both an inevitable attribute of politicians' cognitive
behavior and a highly attractive antidote to the immediate political pressures of crisis
mzmagement. "Lessons of history'' present ready-made conceptual frameworks for the
unknown or the complex.6 For all their appreciation of complexity, uniqueness, and
nuance, there is little evidence that professional historians make "better" policy than
professional politicians when they enter the proverbial Situation Room.7 "Most historians
t Muy, Ernest R. "Lessons" of the Past: The (Jse and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy.New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973; Record, Jeffrey. Making l(ar, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam,
and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002; Jervis,
Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1916.
6 Zashin, Elliot, and Phillip C. Chapman. "The Uses of Metaphor and Analogy: Toward a Renewal of
. 
Political Language." The Journal of Politics 36,2 (1974): 290-326. p.312
' Yertzberger,224.
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cringe at talk of the 'lessons of history.' Trained as specialists and wary of sweeping
comparisons, they flinch from attempts to make past events speak directly to current
policy. They often remind us of what makes circumstances unique, highlighting
differences where others see similarities."8 The decision-making process - the imperative
to act based on imperfect information - turns academic historians and homespun
politicians alike into "practical-intuitive historians."e Whereas academic historians
research texts in the past in the context of a given historical moment, practical-intuitive
historians retrieve them solely in terms of their worth for the present. While the selective
use (and abuse) of the history in framing and justifying the present is sometime
regrettable, "[i]t would be foolhardy for decision-making to ignore the history of a crisis
or the past behavior of an opposing leader...It would also be foolhardy to ignore past,
similar cases, even if they are not identical."l0
I hope that my examination of the Korean Conflict, which operates at the intersection of
diplomatic history, international relations theory, and organizational behavior theory,
might add to an exciting dialogue that confronts the "grand narrative" that has long
dominated the history of U.S. foreign relations.lr By giving emphasis to the ways in
which individual actors' gave meaning to language, my analysis is meant to be taken as
part of a much broader look at the use of language and scripts as vehicles for
communicating meaning in foreign relations. In the conclusion, I will comment on what
t Cohen, Eliot A. "History and Hyperpower)' Foreign Affairs 83,4 (2004): 49-63. p.49.
e Yertzberger,223.
r0 MacDonald, Scot. Rolling the lron Dice: Historical Analogies and Decisions to (Jse Mititary Force.
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000.
ttImmerman, Richard H. "Psychology." In Hogan, Michael J. and Thomas G. Paterson. Explaining the
History of American Foreign Relations,2nd ed. Cambridge: Carnbridge University Press, 2004; Leffler,
Maylvyn P. "National Security." In lbid, pp. 123-136; Costigliola, Frank. "Reading for Meaning: Theory,
Language, and Metaphor." In Ibid, pp.279-303.
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the evidence the Korean case offers us towards the formulation of a theorv of historical
analosies.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
I will first review the contributions of historians, international relations theorists, and
psychologists in helping us understand the "why'' and "how" of using history in
formulating foreign policy. Second, I will examine the historiogaphy of the Korean
Conflict and identify gaps in our understanding of the Pueblo and nuclear crises,
particularly with regard to the influence of historical analogies on U.S. decision-making.
Interdisciplinary Theory
A number of disciplines have added to our understanding of history and foreign policy
formulation and have adequately problematizedthe concept of the rational actor model in
analyzing decision-making. Ernest R. May's "Lessons" of the Past revealed how, in
conflicts ranging from the Second World War to Vietnam, policymakers have used
historical metaphors to frame and justify their decisions. In addition, he prescribed a role
for professional historians in righting the wrongs of policymakers' use of history.t' More
recently, a number of scholars have dusted off May's tome and applied it to a broader
array of historical moments and deepened the analysis. Yuen Foon Khong (Analogies at
War),r3 Jeffrey Record (Making War, Thinking History),to *d Scot MacDonald (Rolling
t' For a treatment of Sino-Korean and Soviet-Korean relations, see Westad, Odd Arne, ed. Brothers in
Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
t3 Bulletin of the Cotd llarinternational History Project 5 (1995); Weathersby, tcattrr1m.-"Soviet Aims in
Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: Evidence from Russian Archives, llorking Paper
No. 8, Cold War International History Project, 2005.
ra Weathersby, Kathryn. "The Korean War Revisite d." Wlson Quarterly 23,3 (1999): 9l-96. pp.92-94.
McKay: U.S. Decision-making in the Korean Conflict
the Iron Dice: Historical Analogies and Decisions to use Military Force in Regional
Contingencies)ls have chosen to examine the decades-long competition between the
Munich and Vietnam analogies in conflicts ranging from Korea to Kosovo. ln his cross
disciplinary work Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis
examines the dynamic relationship between events, lessons, and future behavior.l6 He
laments that "the lessons learned [from history] will be applied to a wide variety of
situations without a careful effort to determine whether the cases are similar or crucial
dimensions."lT
The most common "lessons of history" have often been divided into metaphors and
analogies. In their analysis of political language, Zashin and Chapman distinguish
between the two and analyze the effect of each on learning processes. Historical
metaphors do not serve merely as descriptors; they "add meaning to statements" and
"[have] capacities that are distinctive."l8 Metaphors such as Neville Chamberlain's ill-
fated 1938 Munich meeting with Adolf Hitler have two subjects - "a principal and a
subsidiary."le "Metaphors are used, then, to persuade and to influence attitudes, as well
as to assist in the interpretation of experience."2o Historical analogies, on the other hand,
rely upon the explicit association of two subjects. "The user of an analogy is normally
tt Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean llor: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes
1945-1947. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
16 Weathersby, 93.
" Foot, Rosemary. A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Tall<s.
Ithaca: Cornell Universify Press, I 990.
" 
}r/ru"ao, Michael J. North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferatioz. New York: St.
Martin's, 1995; Sigal, Leon V. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998;
tn tut, Ernest R. "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
'o Khong, Yuen Foong. Analogies at l[/ar: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of
I965 . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1992.
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obliged to announce his purpose and seek the conscious co-operation of his audience in
working out the parallelism that he claims will illuminate his subject."2l In the collective
mind of the intended audience, analogies facilitate the extrapolation of future outcomes
based on causal relationships.22
Jervis and Khong both suggest that metaphors and analogies can lead policymakers to
miscalculate risk and view setbacks as part of the "march of history" towards eventual
victory - the "perseverance effect." Explaining the lack of swift victory in Korea,
presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson wrote in Foreign Afairs: "There is, of course, no
solution to the Korean problem, precisely because it is only a part of the whole Soviet
imperialist drive - an episode,really, in the sweep of history which relentlessly confronts
freedom with thralldom."23 Combined with a belief that the American body politic is
immune to certain human frailties,2a the perseverance effect has a distorting impact on the
decision-making process.
Several authors have attempted to construct a more rigorous methodology around the
myriad factors affecting the use of history.25 Khong envisions six such rationales behind
2r Record, Jeffrey. Making l(ar, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Forcefrom
Korea to Kosovo. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002.
22 MacDonald, Scot. Rolting the lron Dice; Historical Analogies and Decisions to (Jse Military Force.
^. 
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000
" Jewis,222,
'n rbid.22g.
25 Immerman, Richard H. "Psychology." In Hogan, Michael J. and Thomas G. Paterson. Explaining the
History of American Foreign Relations,2nd ed. Cambridge: Carnbridge University Press, 2004; Absent
in the literature on the use of history in foreign policy is an appreciation of how policymakers atternpt to
forecast the effect of their decisions on the enemy's memory. Indeed, the phrase "we'll teach them a
lesson" is a conscious attempt to defeat the enemy in the long-term by creating a short-term situation
from which he or she will extract lessons that will constrain similar behavior in the future. These
preemptive practical-intuitive policies attempt to make the enemy analogize the action and draw a
"lesson" from it, therefore enabling or constraining a course ofaction.
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"analogical explanation": (1) help define the nature of the situation; (2) assess the stakes;
(3) provide prescriptions; (4) predict the chances of success; (5) evaluate moral rightness;
and (6) wam about the dangers associated with a situation.26 Brandstrom et al.
differentiate between unconscious and conscious uses of historical memory and between
explicitly "political" analogies and analogies as "diagnostic tasks" designed to organize
incoming information (the present) according to a prior database (memory).27 Consistent
with this interpretation, the past can impact policy in "enabling" (pushing a course of
action) and "constraining" (warning of the dangers) capacities.28
Also called schemas, frames, conceptualizations and plans, scripts are "descriptions of a
complex object, situation, process, or structure" that concretize thought pattems such as
metaphors, analogies, extrapolations, and cognitive/political uses of the past.2e Khong
proposes four such scripts of historical "lessons" in U.S. foreign policy: (1) fascist
aggression, (2) communist aggression, (3) superpower confrontation, and (a) superpower
cooperation. The Korean Conflict has involved "learning" from "lessons of history" that
fall under all four categories, as we shall see.
2u tbid. l06.
27 
"Dinner menu from the June 25, 1950, Blair House meeting." 25 June, 1950. [Electronic Records],
Records of the Truman Presidential Museum and Library.
28 Declassified documents relating to the Agreed Framework talks have been used where available. The
most comprehensive memoir detailing the process of negotiations is Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman,
and Robert L. Gallucci. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crrsrs. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2004.
2t In some cases, information was proffered off the record to be able to provide a more candid assessment
ofongoing intra- and inter-agency debates on the issue. I have note this in each case.
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Historiography of the Korean Conflict
Diplomatic historians' interest in "historical memory,"'o o, exploring the past in relation
to the ways in which it remembered in the present, has rarely extended into the study of
decision-making at the highest levels.3l In Korean Conflict historiography, particularly
those works dealing with the Pueblo crisis and the nuclear standoffs, this gap is
especially evident.32 The slack left by historians has been taken up increasingly by
international relations theorists, although there have been some recent efforts to reclaim
this lost territory.33 ln this vein, Richard Immerman points out the value of psychological
variables in analyzing decisions in a variety of historical settings, most notably the Cold
War. "Psychological theories can help to explain how and why decision makers act in
this marurer [relying on "lessons of history, drawing analogies to define a situation
identify a phenomenon], and in the process they can provide clues for locating erors
judgment or perception."34
Korean Conflict historiography since the end of the Cold War has been able to explore
previously obscure aspects of the Korean War, but has not adequately taken into account
'o For an excellent example of the ways in which historical memory helps shape contemporary
understandings of the past, see Rosenberg, Emily S. A Date Which Vltill Live: Pearl Harbor in America.
Durham: Duke Universitv Press. 2003.
" 
Schulringer, Robert D. *Memory and Understanding U.S. Foreign Relations." In Hogan, Michael J. and
Thomas G. Paterson. Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004: "Memories take place in the present, but they are related in complex
ways to things that happened in the past. By explaining what happens when the present collides with the
past though the lens of memory historians can better comprehend what has been important about foreign
affairs and how and why notions of what is important have changed."
" 
Lerner, Mitchell. The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy.
Lawrence: Universitv of Kansas Press. 2002.
" 
This is roughly based on the difference elucidated in Snyder, Richard C. and Glenn D. Paige. "The
United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme." In
Snyder, Richard C., H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to
- . 
the Study of International Politics. New York: Free Press of Glencoe/IVlacmillan, 1962. p. 241 .3a Zashinand Chapman, 296.
or
in
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the use of historical memory, particularly on the U.S. side.35 lnstead, the debate hinges
on the extent of the relationship between the Chinese, Soviets, and North Koreans.
Scholars have been greatlyaided by the emergence of previously classified documents on
the other side of the communist divide. Kathryn Weathersby of the Cold War
International History Project has been able to gain access and sort through an impressive
new documentary trail.36 This new "counter-revisionist" school seeks to demonstrate that
Soviet- and Sino-Korean links were much closer than envisioned by the so-called
revisionists, lead by noted Korea scholar Bruce Cumings, who Weathersby charges with
"fviewing] America's intervention in Korea, like its involvement in Vietnam, as
unjustified and counterproductive."3T Cumings, who published his seminal two volume
work The Origins of the Korean llarbefore many of the documents in question became
available, remains deeply critical of the American failure to conceptlualize the Korean
War as a civil conflict rather than a test of the U.S. security parameter.38 Weathersby
counters with the assertion that "[t]here is now no doubt that the original North Korean
attack was a conventional military offensive planned and prepared by the Soviet Union.
While Kim Il Sung had pressed Stalin for permission to reunify Korea by force, North
Korea was not at that time capable of mounting such a campaign."3e She largely ignores
how the U.S. itself was responsible for assigning importance to this phenomenon. A
scholar concerned with historical memory might have focused the archival analysis on
U.S. policymakers' use of "metaphor wars"40 to define the threat posed by Stalin and
35 rbid, 299.
36Ibid. 309.
37 Ibid. 3t t.
38 Khong, 220.
3n Stevenson, Adlai E. "Korea in Perspective." Foreign Afairs 30, 3 (1952): 349-360. p.354.
no Schulzinger, 338.
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Kim Il Sung. In his excellent and all-encompassing study The Korean War, William
Stueck claims that the Korean War substituted for a third World War between the two
superpowers.ot This book goes a long way in framing our discussion of the importance
of U.S. conceptualizations of the conflict - not as a localized wa4 but as a possible
prelude to a final showdown. In other words, wars are not fought purely, or even mostly,
on the basis of objectively-derived "interests." Two works by Rosemary Foot warrant
our attention, for they treat the U.S. decision-making process in detail during moments of
great crisis: A Substitute for Yictory addresses the supposed U.S. inflexibility at the
Armistice talks, while The Wrong War delves into the differing relationships between
presidents and their secretaries of state. Wrong War embodies the bureaucratic politics
method of analysis.'2 Neither of these works, however, deals explicitly with historical
memory. The literature on the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis remains mostly geared towards
policy audiences, owing to the paucity of available documents.a3
III. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
Before proceeding with the substantive sections, it might be useful for me to comment on
the methodological approach employed, spell out the importance I have given to theory in
this analysis, and address potential concerns the reader may have regarding a study which
operates on the margins of diplomatic history, intemational relations theory, and
organizational behavior theory.
ar Stueck, William. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997.
o' Wubben, H.H. "American Prisoners of War in Korea: A Second Look at the "something New in
History" Theme." American Quarterly 22, | (1970):3-19. p.3.o' Two books stand out from this genre, however: Michael J. Mazarr's North Korea and the Bomb and,
Leon V. Sigal's Disarming Strangers.
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There exist notable differences in the way I have gathered evidence related to the three
historical moments that form the crux of my analysis. Government documents, most of
them found in the National Archives or published in the official Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS) series, informed most of the analysis for the Korean War and
Pueblo incident. The picture of policy debate leading up to and through the Korean War
is remarkably complete; we even know that President Truman was served "buttered
asparagus" and "Russian [salad] dressing" during the crucial 25 July 1950 Blair House
meeting.aa The formulation of military and diplomatic options during the Korean War
and Pueblo incident is illustrated by the records of the Departments of State and Defense;
the decision-making environments at each step are documented by the records of the
Executive Office of the President. The student of diplomatic history is well served by the
declassification of documents related to these two events. However, the nuclear crises of
1993-1994 and 2002-2003 leave us with no comparable paper trail. It is in this instance
that I have turned to interviews with former and current U.S. officials to provide a
comprehensive look at the internal decision-making dynamic during the respective
nuclear crises in order to shed light on the individual actors' thought processes.
Skeptics may claim that the inclusion of recent history and, in some cases, events that are
still unfolding, muddies the analysis. Furthermore, it might be argued, relying too heavily
on the actors' own accounts, especially on such a salient and topical issue, does not offer
the same "unvarnished" look as material that has long been in the public domain and
therefore open to greater historiographic debate. Historians, however, are forced to make
do with the sources at hand. I am confident that the questions posed and the answers
1 l
aa Khong, 10.
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rendered have generated descriptions which reflect the historical record that will emerge
as documents axe declassified.4s This is because I am concerned mostly with how the past
is represented in the present as historical memory rather than what events transpired
behind closed doors. I have received information on the 1994 talks from a list of officials
that I believe touches on every relevant agency and policymaker involved in the decision-
making process at that time: a Director of Central lntelligence, various ambassadors,
National Security Council staff members, and senior (under secretary rank) and policy
level (deputy assistant and assistant secretary rank) Department of State officials. In some
cases I have substantiated the veracity of one account by following up on it with another
interviewee.
Since little has been written in the academy on the subject of the 2003-2004 North
Korean nuclear crisis, my approach has been to rely upon newspapers and policy-oriented
publications to buttress the insights offered by an extensive round of interviews with
current U.S. officials involved in U.S. policy vis-d-vis the Korean Peninsula. As with the
Clinton Adminishation case, I have gathered mateial from representatives of various
agencies and at diverse levels of the policy chain: two assistant secretaries of state, senior
and policy level Department of Defense officials (off the record), and various working
level officials in the Department of State. Once more, I feel that the information I have
gathered provides a candid representation of the variety of views on what should
constitute current U.S. policy and, more to the point, what cognitive elements entered the
I 2
a5 Brandstrom et al., 194.
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decision-making p.ocess.o6 [r all cases, interviewees were asked to respond to a uniform
set of questions regarding their use of historical "lessons" in informing policy debate.
In this paper the reader may detect more theory than is perhaps commonly found in
diplomatic history. The U.S. decision-making process is highly formalized and has
involved the same set of actors in the hierarchy (represented by different individuals) in
mynad crises over time. Thus, it makes sense to examine in a theoretical context how
these actors make and carry out decisions. I make an important distinction between
"objective" information, derived from situation-specific intelligence and other reports,
and "personal" information, supplied by the policymaker himlherself prior to entering the
decision-making environment. It is immeasurably more difficult to assess the effect of the
latter on the decision-making process, for it is rarely explicitly stated in policy
deliberations.ot Nonetheless, I have undertaken to accomplish just this task.
IV. STARTING AI\D ENDING THE KOREAN WAR
Recounting his thoughts when he learned that North Korea had invaded the South, Harry
Truman wrote:
o'In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the
weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered
how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to
keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the
Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier."48
ou tbid. t95.
a7 Winograd, Terry. "A Framework for Understanding Discourse." In Just, Marcel Adam, and Patricia A.
Carpenter, eds. Cognitive Processes in Comprehezslon. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Publishers, 1977. p.72.
ot Trumatr, Harry S. Memoirs, VoI. 2: Years of Trial and Hope. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday Press, 1956.
p .333 .
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Below we will see that this account was not simply a rhetorical devise, but a
representation of the actual cognitive processes of many in U.S. policy circles. How did
the apparent determination to avoid repeating the mistakes of appeasement affect
standing U.S. objectives in the peninsula? How did policy options proposed before the
start of hostilities reflect Truman's choice of historical analogy? How did avoiding
another Munich shape the management of the conflict when the going got tough? We will
see how the Munich analogy enabled the initial use of force while constraining the U.S.'s
ability to disengage. By now, the word "aggression" borders on being a metaphor with
forgotten meaning; its rhetorical application is so ubiquitous as to make us forget the
series of historical events from which the meaning of the 1930s was extracted. Shortly
after the Second World War, however, the 1930s had not yet taken on the characteristics
of a defined script.
Prior to the Outbreak of Hostilities
On the eve of North Korea's unannounced invasion of the South, the U.S. government
had a standing policy not to intervene militarily on the Korean Peninsula. From the 8
April 1948 decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea until the invasion on 24 June
1950, President Truman had been overseeing the implementation NSC 8/2. The Army
command was downsized to the lower profile United States Military Advisor Group to
the Republic of Korea. By February 1950, $56 million in military equipment had been
L 4
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donated to the Korean Army, Coast Guard and Police, with $9.8 million more on the
way.4e
Clearly, President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to avoid a military
commitment to an area which had been designated outside the sphere of strategic threat to
core U.S. national security objectives.to In addition, domestic politics strongly favored
limiting engagement. The Senate Republican Policy Committee, while rccognizing a
"moral commitment to South Korea," warned that the U.S. had no "obligation to go to
war on its behalf."sl NSC-68, which moved significantly beyond deterrence and
containment sffategy, had been submitted to the President on 14 April 1950, only a month
and a half before the invasiott." By the spring of 1950, the U.S. had occupied Korea for
almost six years, moving from a few American officers stationed in strategic locations
such as Pusan, to a broader occupation by tactical troops, and finally to a full-fledged
occupation by civil affairs teams by the end of Ig45.s3 The troops' presence would
ensure a U.S. interest in any invasion from the North, although how that interest would be
manifested would remain to be seen.
Deciding to Intervene - the Power of Munich
The speed with which the U.S. decided to respond militarily following the North's
invasion belies the menu of options policymakers had in front of them. While the U.S.
ae 
"Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State on the implementation of the Position of the United
States with Respect to Korea," l0 February 1950. (microfilm). Records of the National Security Council.
p.2.
so May,67.
5r As quoted inMay,74.
52 Record, 37.
53 Cumings,289.
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could have placed unilateral (or sought multilateral) economic sanctions against the
North, it chose military action. The latter was clearly not a "last resort." Two days after
the initial invasion by the North, Truman reportedly remarked to an aide that "Korea is
the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them as we did
in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they'll
move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East. There's no telling what
they'll do, if we don't put up a fight now."54 This analogy would have prescribed,
enunciating the "Truman Doctrine" by drawing a highly public line in the sand. The
stakes were just as high as Greece, as the memoirs of Dean Rusk and Dean Acheson
make clear. Korea, in their view, was not merely a civil war, but a test of U.S. postwar
influence and possibly the beginning of a third world war. "The North Korean attack
seemed a direct challenge to the entire concept of collective security won at such cost
during World War II."ss Rusk, then an Assistant Secretary of State under Secretary Dean
Acheson, expressed the classic security dilemma that faced U.S. policymakers: with
imperfect information about the North's intentions, the U.S. had to plan for the worst, a
major theater war:
"When the North Koreans first attacked, we didn't know if this was a single offensive
or the opening shot in a much broader Communist offensive in Asia. Consequently, in
addition to landing troops in Korea, we took other steps to deter our opponents from
expanding the Korean Conflict into other parts of Asia."s6
There was certainly no shortage of historical antecedents to the original Korean Conflict
between North and South: the Spanish, Greek, and Chinese civil wars were all probably
s-a_May,7l.
" Rusk, Dean. ls I Ssw It. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.p.162.tu rbid. 166.
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more apt situations that would have prescribed different courses of action than that which
was taken: neutrality regarding Spain in 1937; covert action/military assistance regarding
Greece in 1947; and financial aid to the opposition in the Chinese case.sT Instead, Munich
conveniently lumped together the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 -32, the Italian
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, and even the German remilitaization of the Rhineland.ss
The historical analogy helped define the situation (the strong attacking the weak), assess
the stakes (regional security), and provide prescriptions (early U.S. intervention).
Truman's personal memories of the 1930s acted as an enabling force on his decision-
making a decade and a half later. Indeed, there was little debate regarding the validity of
these analogies, or more importantly, their momentous prescriptive power. This is
significant, because the fewer times an analogy, which assumes a certain discontinuity
between the past and the present, has to be made explicitly in speeches or in policy
coordination meetings, the more the message has been internalized and accepted by the
audience.5e The 1930s, with its implied meaning of "weakness breeds defeat," ruled the
day and would live on in future policy deliberations.
A dinner meeting at Blair House on 25 June 1950 provided the first substantive and high
level discussion of the options for resolving the Korea situation. The only major factor
constraining the decision to respond militarily on behalf of the friendly South Korean
govemment was uncertainty regarding the U.S.S.R's reaction. While the service chiefs
favored sending the U.S.S.R a clear message, since "the Korean situation offered as good
an occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere else," they demonstrated
57 MacDonald,78.
tt Ibid, 57.
5e Ibi4 59.
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considerable unease with South Korean capabilities and feared the possible intervention
of mainland China as well as covert support from the U.S.S.R.60 The State Department
and civilian leadership in the Pentagon, however, saw the event through 1930s-tinted
lenses. The secretary of the Air Force repeatedly sought to draw a parallel to the two wars
for the President's benefit, concluding: "We should take calculated risks hoping that our
action will keep the peace."61 During a separate State-Defense Department meeting, a
member of the State Policy Planning Staff argued tbat "if they [can] get away with this
move they would probably move in other areas."62 Truman shared this view and made it
clear that the very success of the nascent U.N. was at stake.63 To this end, he approved
substantially increasing military support to the outnumbered and overpowered South
Korean forces.6a On 30 June, Truman decided to commit U.S. grounds forces, beginning
the Korean War.65
In the diplomatic sphere, the U.S. tried to paint Korea with the brush of Munich (and its
implicit connotations for thwarting future aggression militarily) from the very beginning.
The day after news of the North's action, the U.S. Mission at the U.N. (USUN) quickly
organized a series of bilateral meetings with U.S. friends and allies to coordinate
diplomatic action within the world body. The U.S. was adamant in trying to assign full
uo Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, "Memorandum of Conversation," 25 June 1950, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. 7, Kotea, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
pp.l57-61(hereafter FRUS followed by appropriate year). The U.S. saw Korea as only one of a number
of steps the Communist world was likely to take in order to test the U.S. security parameter, the next
likely test case being Formosa (Taiwan).
ut Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, "Memorandum of Conversation," 25 June 1950, FRUS, 1950,
vol. 7, p.160.
62 Lincoln White, "Notes on Korean Con/tict (from FRUS Editorial Note), 26 June 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol.
- ^ 7 , p . 1 4 3 .
"'Philip C. Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation," 26 June 1950,I6'RUS, 1950, vol. 7, Korea, p.183.
* Philip C. Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation," 25 June 1950, ,FRU^t, 1950, vol. 7, Korea, p.158.
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blame to the North, attempting to include the phrase "unprovoked act of aggression" in
an early U.N. Security Council draft resolution.66 Other Security Council members were
neryous about striking such a combative tone based on so little information.6T
Thus, the decision to "draw the line [U.S. security parameter]" with Korea represented a
departure from previous strategic thinking. To briefly indulge in a counterfactual scenario
will allow us to see the full effect of the "act of aggression" mindset on U.S. diplomatic
and military activity. If the U.S. had viewed the invasion as a domestic Korean affair
rather than a 1939-like blitzkrieg by Communism upon the free world, USUN would not
have pushed for strong condemnatory language, and, most importantly, the view that U.S.
credibility was on the line would not have prevailed at the White House. Without the
emotional power of the State and Defense Departments' portrayal of this crisis as only
one of many to come, it is possible to imagine that Truman would simply have restricted
action to an evacuation of U.S. persons.
A month after U.S. troops entered the Korean War with the approval of the United
Nations Security Council, the National Security Council (NSC) undertook a review of
U.S. policy objectives. Acknowledging that "a global war has not necessarily begun in
Korea and may not eventuate," the NSC analyzed the probability that Korea was a local
testing ground for a global scheme that could also involve other countries not covered by
66 Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, U.S. Mission to the U.N., "Memorandum of
Conversations," 25 June 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol.7, Korea, p.144-45. The actual resolution that was
adopted by the Security Council was much more restrained, merely calling for an immediate cessation of
hostilities.
uT Ibid. 145-46.
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NATO: Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Finland.68 Contrary
to previous assessments undertaken before the war, Korea now fell squarely within the
U.S. security purview.
Dealing with Setbacl<s
Having so convincingly endowed the Korean War with the clear moral purpose of
preventing world war by stopping expansionist aggression dead in its tracks, the U.S.
quickly ran up against the realities on the ground. By 5 July, it was already obvious to
U.S. policymakers that South Korean forces weren't necessarily up to the task, that U.N.
forces were facing unknown terrain, and that Russians and Chinese intentions were still
unclear.6e Worse yet, significant setbacks or total failure in Korea (Korean unification
under communism) after having pledged to stop communist hostility would be worse for
the U.S. position in the Cold War than having never intervened at all.70 The State
Department restated the end goal: "[W]e must be unequivocally clear that we shall press
the Korean issue through to a successful conclusion, subject to a reexamination of general
strategy if the Soviet Union enters the fighting."tt By late July, the U.S. made clear to its
allies that the conflict risked being "very long" and that it had "no intention of fighting a
major war in Kotea."72
ut *The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the
Light of the Korean Situationr A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary."
(microfilm). 8 August 1950.
un Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, "Memorandum to the Secretary of
State," 5 July 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, Korea, p.303.
to lbid, 303: "Furthennore, unless we act resolutely, the political effect upon the Soviet Union will not be
what we hoped to produce in the opening days of the Korean Conflict."
t' tbid. 303.
72 
"Agreed Memorandum, Summary of United States-United Kingdom Discussions on the Present World
Situation, July 20-24,1950, Washington, DC," 24 July 1950, FRUS,1950, vol. 7,Korca,p.463.
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In August 1950, the CIA illustrated the risk of failure in a classic intelligence
understatement: "Although an invasion of North Korea by U.N. forces, could, if
successful, bring several important advantages to the US, it appears at present that grave
risks would be involved in such a course of action. The military success of the operation
is by no means assured. .."73 Far from nipping "aggression" in the bud, the U.S. risked
losing face intemationally and ceding ground to the communist world with little to no
military expenditure on the Soviet Union's behalf. Despite these pronouncements, the
State Department remained enchanted with the possibility of far-reaching benefits a clear
victory would bring: "The bonds of Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the
U.S.S.R, would be weakened...the Chinese Communist regime...might be inclined to
question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee
only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope."7a
From the beginning of the war until the conclusion of the armistice agreement, U.S.
leaders assumed North Korea was an agent of Soviet global ambitions. The aggression
was Soviet in nature and origin and its victim was the entire free world. The CIA
understood that the Soviets intended to "eliminate Anglo-American influence in Europe
and Asia...establish Soviet domination over [these areas]...[and] weaken and disintegrate
the non-Soviet world generally."75 "The North Korean Government is completely under
Kremlin control and there is no possibility that the North Koreans acted without prior
73 'oMemorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency," 18 August 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 7,
Korea, p.601.
to John M. Allison and John K. Emmerson, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, "Draft Memorandurrl" 21
_- 
August 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 7,Korea,p.620.
" "Memorandum by the Cental Intelligence Agency: Conclusions Regarding a Possible Soviet Decision to
Precipitate Global War," 12 October 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 7,Korea, p.937.
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instruction from Moscow. The move against South Korea must therefore be considered a
Soviet move," the State Department intelligence branch warned.76 This axiomatic
postulation precluded the possibility that the U.S. would corne to view the conflict as
simply a civil war for Korean unification.
The localized war scenario was thrown out the window on 28 November when General
Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the U.N. in Korea, cabled the Joint Chiefs
of Staffi "We face an entirely new war...This command has done everything humanly
possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and
strength."77 The new crisis in question was the direct and unmistakable intervention of
communist Chinese forces in the U.N.-Korean Conflict. During an emergency meeting of
the National Security Council, General Marshall emphasized to the president that Chinese
military action was "dictated in large measure by the [Soviet] Politburo."78
The Munich metaphor rang loudest in moments of true crisis. The fear of "appeasing" an
aggressor had a unique ability shape policymakers' calculus. The analogy had two policy
implications: (1) it made a seemingly small, localized conflict seem like a trigger for
world war and (2) it significantly increased the perceived cost of negotiating a cease-fire,
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff said was needed to ensure that the U.S. did not enter into
76 
"Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group, Office of Intelligence Research, Deparftnent of
State." 25 June 1950, FRUS,l95O vol. '1,Korea, pp.148-49.
77 General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, "The Commander in Chief, Far East
(MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 28 November 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, Korea, pp.l237 -38.
tt Philip C. Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation," 28 November 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 7, Korea,
p.1243.
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full-fledged conflict with mainland China.Te In December 1950, when the U.S. faced the
clear possibility of an expanded, regional war involving both major communist powers,
Acheson told the generals in attendance: "[W]e must consider the security of our troops
and the effect on the position of the United States in the Far East and the whole world.
There is danger of our becoming the greatest appeasers of all time if we abandon the
Koreans and they are slaughtered."80 General Bradley told the Pentagon meeting
participants that "we must weigh that [a proposed cease-fire] against Korea and against
the loss of prestige in Asia and Europe. We would lose lndochina and Formosa. The
Germans are akeady saying we proved that we are weak. Appeasement is gaining in
Europe."sl Without the U.S. fear of appearing weak before the world, the decision to
negotiate a cease-fire would likely have been weighted towards avoiding engaging China
and the Soviet Union. Acheson's and others' historical biases considerably prolonged a
conflict that conceivably could have ended in late 1950 before the Chinese intervention.
The generals were nervous about their ability to fight the Chinese and at one point
suggested calling the whole matter off and bringing the troops home; Acheson rejected
this proposition outright.82
Policymakers also invoked history, especially the experience of the last two wars, for
reassurance. The great minds of the cold war - George Kennan, Averell Harriman, Paul
Nitze, Dean Rusk, and Dean Acheson - found themselves in a worse predicament than
7e General Omar Bradley, "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Secretary of Defense
(Marshall)," 4 December 1950, FRUS,1950, vol. 7,Korea,pp.l347-48.
to Philip C. Jessup, "Memorandum of Conversation," 3 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol.7, Korea,
p.1324.
tt Ibid, 1326.t'rbid,1326.
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anything they had envisioned prior to the U.N. intervention. Allies were becoming
neryous about the possibility of a spectacular defeat of U.N. forces.83 The unity that had
prevailed at both the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council (minus the Soviet
Union) during the first act of communist "aggression" could not be mustered for this
latest round of Chinese "aggression." Kennan told the group that "we [are] in a very
difficult position-one which [is] similar to the one the British had been in the last two
wars when they held on when there was no apparcnt reason for it."84
The Decision to Negotiate
By early 1951, an exit strategy was already being discussed with a sense of urgency that
exceeded discussions the previous fall. Several options were discarded at the State
Department working level as so unfeasible or dangerous they didn't warant further
consideration: military action with the end goal of unifying all of Korea by force; military
action that would bring about a change of the communist regime in China; holding the
38th parallel in an indefinite stalemate, and prompt withdrawal "with or without a
pretext."ss The last alternative was judged to harbor the most dangerous implications in
the long term: "the world-wide political effect of a demonstration of U.S. irresolution
would be disastrous...a major aggression by communism would result in a clear
communist victory...[it] would be unacceptable as a matter of national honor and
t' George Ignatiefl Counsellor of the Canadian Embassy, 'oThe Counsellor of the Canadian Embassy
(Ignatieff) to the Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)." 3 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol.
7, 1339; Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India," 4
December 1950, FRUS, vol. 7, Korea, p.1377; David K. E. Bruce, "The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to
the Secretary of State," 5 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, Korea, pp.1387-88.8o Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State," "Memorandum," 4 December 1950, FRUS,
^_ 1950,  vol .7,  Korea,p.7345.o'Dean Rusk, "Memorandum: Outline of Action Regarding Korea," I I February 1951, FRLIS,l951, vol. 7,
Korea and China, pp.l65-67.
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morality."86 Altho.rgh the conflict would drag on for more than two years, the contours
of the cease-fire debate had emerged. The benefit, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
would be the end of a war that had no foreseeable end, freeing U.S. forces necessary for
other commitments worldwide, mainly the defense of Japan and Western Europe.87 The
cost of unilateral U.N. withdrawal as outlined above was the unspecified "serious
repercussions on [the] position of freedom-loving peoples around the wor1d."88
The argument that U.N. forces would be perceived as bowing to tyranny if they
negotiated a cease-fire agteement carried the day and the Defense Department prepared a
presidential statement announcing that "[u]ntil satisfactory arrangements for ending the
aggression and for concluding the fighting have been reached, United Nations military
action against the aggressor must be continued."se On24 March General MacArthur, in a
move that would eventually lead Truman to fire him, recklessly preempted Truman's
planned statement by warning of an all-out attack on mainland China: if sufficiently
threatened, the U.N. command would "depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to
the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and
interior bases [that] would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse."e0
Direct bilateral negotiation between the U.N. Command and the North Koreans began
*u rbid, 165.
tt 
"Memorandum for the Record of a Departrnent of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting," 13 February
1951, FRU9,1951, vol. T,Korea and China, pp.l74-75.
tt Dean Acheson, o'The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations," 17 February
1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 7, Korea and China, p.179.
tt George Marshall, Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the
Secretary of State: [Annex] Draft Text of a Proposed Presidential Statement of Korea," 21 March 1951,
FRUS, 1950, vol. '7,Korea and China, p.254.
'U.S. Congress. Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Serttices
and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty Second Congress, First Session,
To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur From His Assignments in that Area. Washington, DC: GPO,
1951. pp.354r-42.
25
McKay: U.S. Decision-making in the Korean Conflict
only after the U.S. attempted to publicly distance itself from any intention of invading
China, labeling the very idea communist propaganda. The cease-fire talks, led by Vice
Admiral Tumer Joy, began on 10 July 1951. We will see in the penultimate section how
the outcome of these talks was analogized by U.S. participants in the nuclear talks with
North Korea in2003-04 and, to a lesser extent, in 1994.
Rhetoric and the Korean War
If historical analogies serve a cognitive purpose - to give shape to uncertainty - then they
also are used towards explicitly political ends - to give shape to and justify an uncertain
outcome. The Munich-Korea analogy was used ex post facto by politically-embattled
presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson to evaluate the moral rightness of the Korean
War, which by 1952 was being derisively called "Truman's'War":
"What would have happened if the United States and the United Nations had ignored
the Korean aggression?... [W]ould not the Soviet Union, having challenged us
successfully in Korea,have follgwed that challenge with another? And still another?
Munich would follow Munich."el
The above argument involved the use of precise language intended to associate the
uncertainties of Korea with the clear objectives and overwhelming victory of the Second
World War.
The Korean War generated numerous "lessons of history" that have been applied
rhetorically by policymakers to situations ranging from the Vietnam War to the 1994
Agreed Framework talks and the 2003 invasion of haq. A State Department document
drafted in 1965 with an eye towards Vietnam policymakers enumerates the "lessons" that
26
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had informed Korea and, in turn, that could, it is implied, be applied to other Asian crises.
"[O]ur action in Korea reflected three elements...a recognition that a defense line in Asia,
stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interests, that
those vital interests could be affected by action on the mainland of Asia...[and] an
understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, that
there must be local political, economic, and military strength in making aggression
unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness of major external
powers both to assist and to intervene if required."e2
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, justifying the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq
after the fact, wrote of an encounter with a young Korean reporter:
"I told her about a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula, taken at night, that I keep
on a table in my Pentagon office. North of the demilitarized zone there is nothing but
darkness - except a pinprick of light around Pyongyang - while the entire country
of South Korea is ablaze in light, the light of freedom. Korean freedom was won at a
terrible cost - tens of thousands of lives, including more than 33,000 Americans
killed in action. Was it worth it? You bet. Just as it was worth it in Germany and
France and Italy and in the Pacific in World War II. And just as it is worth it in
Afghanistan and Iraq today."e3
This represents an attempt to place the Korean War squarely in the camp of the classic
U.S. victories over fascist aggression, a successful application of the "lessons" of
Munich. The emotive power of the 1930s aggression analogy invites us to consider the
components of the analogy and how they structure language and, by extension, thought.
The author's binary opposition of (physical and symbolic) light and darkness evokes a
clear moral imperative to intervene on the side of freedom. The last two sentences'
ez Department of State Bulletin,8 February 1965, p. l7l .
e3 Rumsfeld, Donald H. "The Price of Freedom in kaq." The New York Times. 19 March 2004.
27
McKay: U.S. Decision-making in the Korean Conflict
syntaxes condense disparate geographical locations across a wide swath of time into one
prescriptive script: from aggression to U.S. intervention to thriving, democratic society.
V. THE U.S.S. PUEBLO CRISIS
The second historical moment I will examine involved a powerful analogy that served to
constrain rather than enable the use of military force. Whereas the "lessons" of the 1930s
"taught" policymakers to avoid appeasing acts of aggression because the tyrant's lust for
expansion could never be fulfilled, the analogies used in the debate surrounding the North
Korean capture of the spy ship U.S.S. Pueblo warned policymakers of the pitfalls of a
swift military response. The incident was only one of several North-Korean instigated
incidents that helped shape a narrative of supposed North Korean irrationality or twisted
rationality that took hold in policy circles as well as in American popular culture.
North Korea before thePueblo
The military stalemate between North and South Korea did not give rise to any of the
analogies generated by the Korean War. During the 1960s, a dual narrative of
irrationality/twisted rationality gradually was built around North Korea's seemingly
erratic actions during the Cold War, particularly from 1966 to 1969. The North played
outside of the rule set of conventional diplomacy and military action, sponsoring airplane
hijackings, commando team beach landings, and assassination attempts.ea Admiral Tumer
Joy had written in 1952 "[A] primary Westem characteristic the Communists rely upon
in executing their delaying technique is our concern for human suffering. Since they are
ea 'North Korean Aggression against the South." March 1969. fElectronic Records], Records of the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, Record Group 263; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
pp.3-5.
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totally unaffected by human considerations, Communists are willing to impose delays or
negotiations even if such delays mean greatly increased human suffering and loss of
life."es Joy represented an important formulation of the twisted rationality narrative. The
brief period leading up to the U.S.S. Pueblo crisis has received little attention from
historians of U.S. foreign relations.e6 However, the inability of U.S. policymakers and the
intelligence community to grasp the motivations behind the skirmishes that occurred
between U.S./South Korean and North Korean forces in the 1966-1968 timeframe
significantly contributed to the difficulty of quickly formulating a response to the
Pueblo's capture. In order to understand U.S. policymakers' historical frame of reference
at the time of the Pueblo, we now tum to the undeclared war along theDMZ.Intelligence
on North Korean acts of aggression during the two year period preceding the Pueblo set
the backdrop for the U.S. reaction in a time characterized by high tension.
A 1969 CIA report titled'North Korean Aggression against the South" began: "Korea is
so removed from much of the world, both culturally and geographically, that it is
something of a problem to focus world attention on potential trouble there."e7 The report
went on to recommend analogies policymakers might use in order to shore up support for
anticommunism efforts worldwide. The schema, or l'description of a complex object,
situation, process, or structure,"g8 was communist expansion,ge and the intended effect
was to frame local insurgencies as disingenuous communist plots: "It might be profitable
e5 Joy, C. Turner. How Communists Negotiafe. Santa Monica, California: Fidelis, 1952. pp.39-40.
e6 Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. "The Quiet War: Combat Operations along the Korean Demilitanzed, Zone,
1966-1969." The Journal of Military History 64, 2 (2000): 439-457. p.439.
e7 
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in many areas to point out these similarities between North Korea's efforts to infiltrate
troops with the aim of creating a picture of a genuine rebellion and the efforts of North
Vietnam and Cuba."loo
The South Koreans referred to activity along the DMZ from 1966-1969 as the "Quiet
'W'ar."101 In the fall of 1966, the "stale, but semi-dangerous, state of affairs" was
punctured by a series of raids across the eastem, central, and western sectors of the DMZ,
killing dozens of South Korean soldiers.l02 U.S. and South Korean leaders conceived of a
direct relationship between U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the attacks of the North
Koreans, which culminated in the bold 18 January 1968 attempt to assassinate the South
Korean president. President Park had speculated two years earlier that "[i]f fighting
increases in Vietnam, there may be increased and more sustained pressure at the
DMZ."I03 The link between North Korean actions and force levels in Vietnam would
dominate much of U.S. policymakers' analysis of the North Koreans' rationale behind the
Pueblo.
Tonkin Gulf...or Cuba?
On 23 January 1968, a small Navy trawler-class surface ship conducting surveillance
allegedly in international water, the U.S.S. Pueblo, was fired upon and towed to Wonsan
too 
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harbor by North Korean naval craft.loa Betraying his sense of exhaustion after seven
years on the job, outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told his designated
successor, Clark Clifford: "this is what it is like on a typical day. We had an inadvertent
intrusion into Cambodia. We lost a B-52 with four H-bombs aboard. We had an
intelligence ship captured by the North Koreans."l0' The Pueblo predicament came just
four years after a similarly ambiguous attack on a U.S. vessel - the Gulf of Tonkin
incident involving the U.S.S. Liberty that launched the Vietnam War. The last major
crisis with nuclear ramifications prior to 1968 was the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. What
policy implications might each of these two analogies carry? The initial matters to be
resolved in an impromptu White House meeting on the Pueblo were: (1) attempt to divine
North Korean intentions behind the capture, (2) estimate the regime's probable future
actions, and (3) formulate an immediate diplomatic response and assess future options.l06
The CIA and the embassy in Seoul, despite their lack of hard information, saw the Pueblo
as the latest in a string of aggressive moves designed to distract the effort in Vietnam
and/or provoke renewed hostilities.l0T It was judged too difficult to guess what North
Korea would do with the sailors it now had in its possession.lOs
'oo 
"TelegramFrom the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union," 23 January 1968, FRUS,
19 64-1968, vol. 29, Korea, p.45 9.tot 
"Notes of the President's Tuesday National Security Lunch," 23 January 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol.
29,Korea,p.460.tou 
"Summary Minutes of Pueblo Group," 24 January 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol.29, Korea, p.469.107 Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, "Memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara,"
23 January 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968,vot.29, Korea, p.464;"Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the
Department of State," 24 January 1968, FfiUS, 1964-1968, vol.29, Korea, p.481.tot 
"Notes of the President's Meeting With the National Security Council," 24 Jamtary 1968, FRUS, 1964-
1968, vol. 29, Korea, p.479.
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Johnson suggested the various options at hand: "[1] hitting the North Koreans with U.S.
forces, [2] [g]etting a thorough explanation, [3] [c]apturing one of their ships."lOe
Conceiving of the situation according to the scripts of previous crises caused
policymakers to lean towards different alternatives. The White House task force favored
a strong diplomatic push before considering the first and third options. Participants
decided to take the matter to the U.N. Security Council in order to provide stronger
grounds for any eventual military retaliation, although Secretary of State Dean Rusk
doubted a resolution could be passed.llo Walter Rostow, Special Assistant to the
President, was the first to reach for the Cuban crisis analogy to frame the discussion,
which included the Secretaries of Defense and State as well as the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. The conversation that followed quickly became a rhetorical battle of analogies.
Rostow said: "In the Cuban missile crisis we faced the danger that the U.N. would freeze
the status quo. The U.N. resolution might state that actions were to be taken without the
use of force. This could prevent or hinder our freedom of action." Rusk warned the group
about falling prey to the easy prescriptions of the comparison by pointing out obvious
contrasts: "This is somewhat different from the Cuban crisis. Then, the presence of the
missiles was not generally known. We were able to announce the presence of the missiles
at the time we announced our action. Here, the basic facts are already known conceming
the Pueblo affair."rlr Joseph Sisco, an Assistant Secretary of State, suggested "the
analogy is closer to the Tonkin Gulf incident. We convoked the [U.N.] Security Council,
made statements, but asked for no formal action." An Under Secretary of State in
tot 
"Notes of the President's Tuesday National Security Lunch," 23 lanuary 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol.
29, Korea, p.461.
rr0 
"Minutes of Meeting: Meeting on Korean Crisis Without the President," 24 January 1968, FRUS, 1964-
1968, vol. 29, Korca, p.485.trt Ibid- 485.
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attendance reminded the group that, in Cuba, when the U.N. vote had failed, the U.S. had
at least had cover from the Organization of American States, which was not presently an
option.ll2 Cuba was clearly on everyone's mind. It represented a recent and compelling
example of a crisis that had successfully and carefully been managed to a peaceful
resolution by resorting only to measured diplomatic steps. On 26 January, McNamara
suggested that a group organized by the State Department meet periodically "like we had
in the Cuban Missile Crisis."l13 Johnson agreed: "All of you should meet regularly and
get as well organized in this situation as we were in the...Crisis...Let's not have us
charged with failure to deal with the situation properly."lta McNamara even made a
reference to the number of airplanes used during the Cuban crisis when discussing air-
cover for the Pueblo's replacement.l15
A day later, on 25 larnary, Johnson, who was still ambivalent on the use of force,
remained preoccupied by the Gulf of Tonkin image. He asked McNamara: "Was the
Turner Joy"u an intelligence ship?" The Defense Secretary, not anxious to draw the same
parallel, replied: "The Turner Joy and the Pueblo are not the same tlpe of ship. They do
not have the same collection devices."llt Giu"n the Cold War setting, the more
fundamental question facing the group was how the Soviet Union would respond to any
U.S. retaliatory action. What "lessons" did Cuba or other historical analogy carry
t t ' Ib id,485.
rt' 
"Notes of President's Friday Morning Meeting on the Pueblo Incident," 26 January 1968, F'RUS,
1968, vol. 29, Korea, p.521.
tto lbid, 529.
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116 The Turner Joy was one of the ships that the North Vietnamese reportedly torpedoes in the Gulf of
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regarding the signaling of strength? Johnson raised the contents of a cable from the
Moscow embassy, reading "[t]hey [the Communists] always react negatively to a show of
force," effectively warning the group against the military options in front of them.
Walter Rostow countered: "Mr. President, this was not the lesson of the Cuban missile
crises or the Berlin crises [sic]."
The Cuba/Berlin analogy delivered a clear script for all those in attendance: a strong
show of force by the U.S. - the Navy's "quarantine" that had diffused a potential nuclear
powder keg between superpowers - resulted in the Communists backing off. The Gulf of
Tonkin analogy provided a competing script: the hasty decision to respond to a
Communist threat military had later angered Congress and produced a strategic situation
in 1968 far removed from the one intended in 1964. State Department officials implored
Johnson to avoid a military response. Seemingly aware of the latter analogy's cognitive
effect, Secretary Rusk told the president: "I have reservations making the Tonkin Gulf
resolution [course of action] unless the other side [North Korea and/or the Soviets] forces
our hand."118 Under Secretary of State [first name] Katzenbach informed the president
that "the only way to get that ship out with the crew is talking through diplomatic
channels."lle Rusk also counseled against Rostow's earlier Cuba "lesson" that a strong
show of force was needed: "We cannot shoot the men out of there. The North Koreans do
not have vessels on the high seas that we can seize."t'o The lines in the military response
debate were drawn. McNamara, uneasy with Johnson's repeated references to the Tonkin
ttt'Notes on the President's Luncheon Meeting," 25 January 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968,vol.29, Korea,
p.508.
ttt Ibid, 509.
t'o Ibid. 509.
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Gulf, favored a symbolic military buildup in the area: "We would like to move certain
forces to the area. We need to place ourselves. The Chiefs fof the armed services] would
like to move 268-52s,15 to Okinawa and 11 to Guam."121 Despite the objections of
Clark Clifford, who worried that if '\ve pose a threat to North Korea and do nothing, we
are in avety difficult situation,"1" the president moved the group to send B-52 bombers
to South Korea. The group ruled out Johnson's third proposed option - the retaliatory
capture of a North Korean ship.
On the evening of the same day, 25 January, the White House task force convened again,
to consider the various options on the "show of force" menu. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs proposed a somewhat nilrow range of alternatives to the group: mining various
North Korean ports, interdicting costal shipping, striking targets by air or from a ship,
and replacing the Pueblo with another ship supported with sufficient air and naval
cover."l23 In the Cold War, where many diplomatic or military incidents regardless of
regional context were immediately and invariably interpreted as a test of U.S. strength in
the face of aggression, most of the "lessons of history" that U.S. policymakers used
publicly and privately relating to the Pueblo revolved around previous situations that
involved successful or failed shows of strength. McNamara told the group: "[t]he great
danger that we must avoid is that the Soviets and the North Vietnamese will interpret
something that we do as a sign of weakness."l24 The president responded that "the
Communist[s] never react well to a show of force. That was not the lesson learned in the
r2r lbid, 509.
t" Ibid. 5r l.
r23 
"Notes on the President's Thursday Night Meeting on the Pueblo Incident," 25 lanuary 1968, ,FRUS,
1964-1968, vol.29, Korea, p.514.
''n Ibid. 516.
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Middle East and in the Cuban Missile Crisis. We must not let them misjudge our strength
so that they will be encouraged to do this type of thing again.,125 1, these initial hours of
the crisis, policynakers favored at least a moderate show of force to support their
diplomatic efforts; only later would the constrictive power of the Tonkin script weigh on
their minds. A posture enabled by the Cuba "show of force" analogy would be aimed at
"[striking] back in retaliation for this ship seizure," while a posture constrained by
possible pitfalls associated with the Tonkin incident would limit action to merely
"[getting] the ship back,"126 something that could more likely be resolved diplomatically.
Responding to Johnson's allusion to the "lessons" of Cuba and implicitly referring to
Vietnam, Clark Clifford said: "I can stand a minor set back [sic] to our position rather
than to take action which may lead us into another war. The capture of a spy ship is not
worth us going to wat."r21
Johnson soon became worried that the seizure of the ship might compel him to act
militarily in order to save political face before Congress and diplomatic face before the
world. The U.S.S. Liberty analogy served to constrain U.S. policy options by warning of
the dangers involved. Clark Clifford told the president: "I afir concerned about using this
incident as the basis for major military actions. As in the case of the U.S.S. Liberty, this is
not a clear case. If we can find a way out of this with face, we should do so."l28 In
addition, Johnson was aware that members of Congress were likely to make the mental
parallel to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and he was determined to avoid the mistake of not
t" rbid, 516.t 'u Ibid,517.
'" Ibid, 519.
r28 
"Minutes on Korean Crisis Without the President," 24 January 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol.29,Korea,
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fully informing Congress before taking action. "The Tonkin Resolution wasn't very
effective," Johnson told his advisors, "If they [Congress] murder us on Vietnam
with...the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, what are we going to do in a situation like this[?]"r2e
"[I]f the Tonkin Gulf means nothing, what do we do here[?] We do not want to exercise
power and authority without the support and approval of the Congress."l30
The president recommended to McNamara that a special naval investigative panel be set
up like the one that testified before Congress in 1964.131 "I think you should set an
independent board to investigate this whole matter to head off any investigations by the
Congress or other groups. Have you checked this Gulf of Tonkin theory?" Johnson asked
the Defense Secretary.l32 Through an intermediary, the president then turned to former
President and General Dwight Eisenhower for advice: "What actions could be taken; how
should the Congress be associated with these actions (the experience in the Dominican
Republic and in Vietnam IU.,S..S. Libertyl is pertinentl."l33 Eisenhower thought it
important to "act 'while the iron is hot' and while the Pueblo affair is fresh in peoples'
minds... we should be careful not to demand or threaten anything that we can't back
up."t'* In Congress, there was suspicion about "another Liberty" on the one hand and
partisan accusations that Johnson had left the sailors stranded on the other hand. "The
mistreatment of the Pueblo's men is but the latest in a long list of cases which prove
t'n 
"Not", of the President's Breakfast 25 January 1968, FRUS, 19@-1968, vol. 29, Korea,
p.503.
t'o Ibid, 503.t" 
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beyond a reasonable doubt the basic inhumanity of communism," said Congressman John
Ashbrook. "[W]e as Members of Congress want to know and I think the American public
is deserving of knowing just who were those responsible in varying degrees for nakedly
exposing this ship and making those decisions which obviously led to this most sorry
chapter in our naval history."l35 In the end, the U.S. was forced to issue an official
apology in order to secure the sailors' release. The lesson was clear in the minds of
policymakers: seizing U.S. ships was a deliberate attempt to humiliate the U.S. and
escalate a conflict.136
By 30 lanuary, five days after the first series of emergency White House meetings,
Captain Bucher, the commanding officer onboard the Pueblo, had issued a number of
inflammatory anti-American 'oconfessions" from captivity in North Korea. There was
substantial disagreement on whether he had "turned" or had been drugged and forced to
write something. Johnson believed the captain to be a traitor and disagreed with the
military, which had found "little instability in [Bucher's] background,"l37 and he once
more leaned towards escalating the military response.
Privately, Rostow told General Wheeler, the Joint Chiefs Chairman, that he found the
president "trigger-happy." Wheeler responded that "[p]ersonally, I find none of the
militery courses of action particularly attractive."l38 Reading the Pueblo documents for
the meaning conveyed by meeting participants' use of language yields a very different
t" Hon. John M. Ashbrook, Congressional Record,30 January 1969.
t36 Khong, 5; Neustadt and May, 58-62.
r37'Notes of the President's Foreign Affairs Luncheon," 30 January 1968, FfiUS, 1964-1968, vol. 29,
Korea,p.572.
r38 Ibid, 574.
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interpretation than any attempt to present a'Just the facts" account emphasizing cause
and effect. In this mode of analysis, the very mention of "another" Cuba, Berlin, or
Tonkin Gulf portends powerful and sometimes clashing policy prescriptions based on
their emotive power. Each analogy, with its implied "lesson of history" for the Pueblo
crisis, defined the situation according to fixed scripts in the individual actors' memory:
brinksmanship, resolve, credibility, menace, and entanglement. Johnson's Pueblo
response, unlike Truman's 1950 Korean intervention, involved a sequence of events
carried out with little clear idea of the future state of affairs policymakers wished to bring
about. Whereas in the Korean War, the 38th parallel debate notwithstanding, Truman was
unequivocal in his desire to see a repulsion of Communist aggression, Johnson was
throughout the crisis unsure about his aims and uneasy with the options laid out before
him.
VI. TWO NUCLEAR CRISES: COMPETING ANALOGIES
The post-Cold War era engendered two remarkably similar nuclear crises on the Korean
peninsula, both related to the North's spotty record with the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty Q.[PT). I will attempt to demonstrate how analogical reasoning affected outcomes
in the 1993-1994 Agreed Framework talks under the Clinton administration, and the
2002-2003 multi-party talks under the Bush administration. What historical analogies did
actors in each moment employ privately and publicly to weigh the benefits and risks of
negotiating with North Korea? What policy prescriptions did each analogy provide? I am
operating under the assumption that a series of interrelated mini-crises constituted the
39
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known as the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis: (1) the 1993 North Korean withdrawal from the
NPT, (2) the negotiating setbacks the U.S. suffered during the 1994 Agreed Framework
talks in New York, and (3) the 1994 "Bobby Hall" hostage incident that almost derailed
the Agreed Framework.l3e I have chosen these three "snapshots" of the 1993-tgg4
nuclear crises because they represent moments during which the decision period was
particularly short, the number of policy actors was limited, and available information was
considered even more scarce than usual.
1993: How to Respond?
A brief look at the developments that lead to the 1993-1994 crisis will allow us to place
policymakers decisions in context. Encouraged by the U.S.S.R, North Korea joined the
NPT in 1985 and the U.N. in 1991.140 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
first reported "inconsistencies" in the North's nuclear program during an ad hoc
inspection in July 1992. Less than a year later, the regime announced its intention to
withdraw from the NPT, sparking the first East Asian crisis for the incoming Clinton
administration. The administration chose the path of bilateral negotiations with North
Korea in order to freeze the reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods, preserve the integrity of the
NPT, and prevent future North Korean proliferation efforts. I will focus on the decision
of whether to engage North Korea constructively or pursue a series of activities that
would have laid the groundwork for a military tesporrse.tot
t" Moois, Scott R. "America's Most Recent Prisoner of War: The Warrant Officer Bobby Hall Incident."
The Army Lawyer (September 1996): 3-33.
too Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. Going Critical: The First North Korean
Nuclear Crisrs. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. p.409
rar It should be noted that this was not a completely "either-or" proposition. The Defense Department
drafted extensive air strike plans in the event that the president decided to use force. The U.S.
40
McKay: U.S. Decision-making in the Korean Conflict
The original Korean War armistice talks framed the issue of whether to negotiate. The
theatrical aspect of the 1994 negotiations, complete with repetitious television images of
North Korean soldiers goose-stepping across the Pyongyang central square,to' reinforced
the fact that, if undertaken, negotiations would mark the first time top officials from both
sides would be meeting since the end of the Korean War. This analogy, which employed
the 1952-1953 armistice talks as the subsidiary subject, presented an enemy who was
cunning, shameless, inhumane, arrogant, and, above all, not to be trusted. Based on his
experiences during the Armistice negotiations, Admiral Turner C. Joy wrote in 1952:
"'We must not negotiate merely because the enemy wants to do so. Once we have decided
that to negotiate is in the best interests of freedom, we should do so with the/a// backing
of the strength of the United States...We must negotiate not merely from strength, but
with strengfh.rrl43 In 1994, no doubt realizingthe power of the Armistice Talks analogy to
hamper U.S. efforts at constructive engagement, a staff member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) presented the U.S. delegation with a copy of Joy's book, How Communists
Negotiate. Robert Gallucci, an assistant secretary of state and head of the delegation, took
away this message from the analogy from the JCS staffers' comparison: "If fthe North
Koreans] act nasty, they are nast|, but if they act nice, they are sneaky."l44 The Joy book
remains required reading inside the Pentagon's Office of Negotiations Policy to this
dav.lo5
commander in chiel U.S. Forces Korea, General Luck, went to the length of requesting that a Patriot
Missile Battalion (air defense system) be deployed south of the DMZ.
tn'Cumings, Bruce. North Korea: Another Country. New York The New Press, 2004.
la3 Joy, 178.
r*  wi t  e ta l . .52.
tot Roberts, Guy R, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, Oral interview by the
author, 3 September 2004.
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During policy debates in 1993-1994, a second analogy served to counteract the
constraining analogy of 1952. This referent evoked the superpower confrontation schema
to paint a picture of two equals staring each other down until one "blinked" - the 1962
Cuban missile crisis between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. In their 2004 group memoir Going
Critical, the U.S. officials involved in the 1994 talks framed the issue this way: "This
negotiation was the first critical test in the most serious crisis the world had ever
experienced since the superpower confrontation over Soviet missiles in Cuba some three
decades earlier."146 In early lgg3, the Cuban missile crisis analogy was most likely a
cognitive learning task, since the U.S. actors saw themselves as facing an enemy who
posed an existential threat to U.S. securityl4T who could be made to "blink" if sufficient
tenacity were applied.la8 On 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its intention of
withdrawing from the NPT. By June of the same year, the U.S. had sent a team to New
York to sit down and negotiate an agreement that would restore North Korea's
commitments to the international non-proliferation regime. The U.S. and South Korea
differed on the appropriate approach to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. With
Clinton just arrived in office, the South Koreans had trouble assessing how "tough" he
would be with their neighbor. A working level State Department official recalls that
"throughout the crisis 11993-19941, we had difficulties dealing with our South Korean
tnu wit et al.. xiii.
tnt Numerous politicians and commentators have used the term "existential threat" to mean an opponent's
ability to significantly damage the homeland and not simply U.S. interests abroad. Francis Fukayama
defines existential threats as "tlreats to our existence as a nation or as a democratic regime." (Fukuyama,
Francis. "The Neoconservative Moment." The National Interest 76 (2004):57-68.)
ra8 By the time the event was commited to paper in the form of a memoir in2004, the analogy was injected
into a political debate over whether once more to pursue bilateral talks with North Korea. The authors
wished to stress the enabling impact of the Agreed Framework analogy.
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allies. I recall comparing this to the history of our relationship with various South
Vietnamese govemments during the Vietnam War."l4e
In writing the "definitive" account of the first Korean nuclear crisis, the architects of the
1994 Agteed Framework were no doubt following Winston Churchill's famous remark to
Joseph Stalin at the Tehran Conference in 1943: "History will judge us kindly...because I
shall write it."l50 The authors attempted to make unambiguous the lessons which future
generations should derive from their experience: "Set strategic priorities, then stick to
them...t5t use multilateral institutions and forums to reinforce U.S. diplomacy...ls2
negotiated arrangements can advance U.S. interests even if the other party engages in
cheating."ls3
How best to respond to a situation "different from any other"?lsa The debate on an
appropriate U.S. response ranged from a referral to the U.N. Security Council to a
strategic air strike of North Korean nuclear facilities. Defense Secretary Perry told the
participants of an emergency meeting on the issue that they should be careful of a "Guns
of August" situation, referencing a book by the same name in which conflicting signals
ignited hostilities (the First World War) that no side wanted: "As we deploy [military
forces in the region - show of force] to cover their possible reaction to a U.N. vote on
lae Hubbard, Thomas, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Interview via
electronic correspondence by the author, 4 April 2005.
tto Charmley, John. "Churchill: The Gathering Storm." BCC Online History, 2004.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/ttistory/war/wwtwo/churchill_gathering_storm_0l.shtrnl>
rsr wit eta1.,396.
tt ' Ibid. 399.
" ' Ib id,4o5.tto Samo.e, Gary, Former Deputy to Assistant Secretary during the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework
Talks, Interview via electronic correspondence by the author, 4 April 2005: "The 1994 crisis was different
from any other sifuation in my memory or experience."
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sanctions, the DPRK might respond to us prompting our reaction "a la Barbara
Tuchman."ls5 This analogy served to constrain the excessive use of force in the early
days of the conflict and warned of the dangers of brash military action. The interagency
process eventually agreed upon high-level bilateral talks directly with North Korea - the
negotiations leading up to the signing of the U.S.-North Korea "Agreed Framework."
The 1994 Agreed Framework Tall<s
The Agreed Framework negotiations themselves constitute the second episode I will
examine within the 1993-1994 crisis. Policymakers, we will see, employed a number of
historical analogies to frame the uncertainties surrounding the negotiations. A number of
analogies employed by policymakers during the decision-making process offered
competing prescriptions based on their logic. Two months following the NPT withdrawal
of 12 March 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 825, which, on the
advice of the IAEA Board of Governors, called on North Korea to comply with its NPT
safeguard agreements. In May 1993, conscious of the importance the North Koreans
placed on signals and protocol, the U.S. sent a junior Foreign Service officer to meet the
North Korean delegation, lead by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, at New York's
JFK Airport. The issue of a U.S. military buildup in theater loomed over the talks in
Geneva and New York. Secretary of Defense William Perry was well aware of the wide-
ranging effects of even the smallest of signals on the international stage:
"We must understand that every course of action we could take has consequences.
Acquiescing now to an active North Korean nuclear program would invite a future
crisis. Taking military action now would invite an immediate crisis...It is possible
that North Korea would misperceive these efforts as provocations. We must face that
r55 Gallucci, Robert L., Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Interview via
electronic correspondence by the author, 3 April 2005.
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possibility, comparing that risk to the far greater risk of letting North Korea develop
the capability of producing.a.nuclear arsenal or the risk inherent in not maintaining
the readiness of our forces."tto
The 1994 Agreed Framework Talks illustrate the double meaning of the Cuban Missile
Crisis. On the one hand and as it was often used during deliberation in the Pueblo
incident, Cuba represents a successful "show of force" against communism; certainly, the
quarantine of Soviet ships was a daring strategic feat. On the other hand and as it was
employed in the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis, Cuba "taught" policymakers that they should
engage in high-level diplomacy and pay strong attention to signals. "There were many
occasions when we got responses from the North that were ambiguous, with negative or
positive interpretations possible, and someone said it was "Bobby Kennedy time"
again...as in Kennedy's reaction to the two messages in different channels from
Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis and his proposal to ignore the message we
didn't like and respond to the one we liked."157 In this instance, the meaning of "Cuba"
was not that the U.S. should undertake a show of force to repel an act of aggression, but
that extreme caution should exercised and attention should be paid to conflicting signals
from the other side.
The 1994 "Bobbv Hall Incident"
The third snapshot I will examine within the broader 1993-1994 crisis illustrates the
North Koreans' unwavering desire to negotiate with the U.S. directly, rather than through
the Military Armistice Commission (whose senior representative at the time was a South
156 
"Remarks by Secretary of Defense William Perry to the Asia Society," Federal News Service, 3 May
1994.
r57 Gallucci, Robert L., Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Interview via
electronic correspondence by the author, 3 April 2005.
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Korean), the mechanism for implementing the Agreed Framework. The capture of U.S.
Army Warrant Officer Bobby Hall provided an opportunity for the North to engage a
U.S. official face to face, an event they hoped would lead to a sustained and, most of
importantly, bilateral diplomatic intercourse with the U.S.1s8 The North's ultimate goal
was the full normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations with the U.S. On t7
December 1994,two Army officers piloted an older-model OH-58 observation helicopter
that "lacked advanced navigational equipment such as a global positioning system" from
Camp Page, South Korea on a routine "familiaization flight" with the purpose of
orienting both crew members "to the terrain along the no-fly zone that parallels the
DMZ."rse The helicopter crossed far into North Korean territory, allegedly by accident,
and was shot down by North Korean antiaircraft fire. The surviving copilot, Bobby Hall,
was held captive and subjected to many of the same abuses as the Pueblo crew.
According to an Army report, "the [North Korean] interrogator lectured WO Hall about
the U.S.S. Pueblo incident and how its crew was not released until they made a written
statement after a year in captivity. Prior to this, WO Hall had never heard of the U.S.S.
Pueblo incident."160
This detail is not included merely out of intellectual interest; for U.S. policymakers back
in Washington, it framed the crisis according to the outcomes of the Pueblo crisis. The
Bobby Hall incident was hardly the first such act; separate helicopter shoot-downs and
subsequent hostage-holding (when there were survivors) had occurred in 1963, 1969,
1974, and 1977. All these instances could have served to frame the range of options
46
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available and the pitfalls inherent in each. Instead, Deputy Assistant of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas C. Hubbard, who was sent to Pyongyang to negotiate
the Hill's release, cognitively retrieved the Pueblo crisis for applicable "lessons of the
past." He recalls that, prior to his departure when devising the U.S. negotiating posture,
"history weighed heavily on my mind."l6l "I carefully reviewed the history of the Pueblo
incident for lessons on how (or how not) to deal with what amounted to a hostage
situation." With his North Korean interlocutors, Hubbard sought to create a historical
analogy that would compete with the Pueblo, which symbolized U.S. defeat: "In my
meetings with North Korean officials, I pointed out that continuing to hold our pilot who
entered North Korean airspace accidentally would make them look like the kanians who
took our Embassy hostage [in 1979]. This, I argued, was incompatible with the kind of
US-DPRK relationship envisaged in the Agreed Framework."162 The Iranian hostage
analogy carried multiple meanings, however. In the sense intended by Hubbard, the
example connoted a country that found itself cut off from normal relations with the U.S.
for a quarter century following the taking of hostages.163 trt another, perhaps unintended,
sense of the analogy, the Iranian students successfully engaged in saber-rattling to the
point of inviting a U.S. military response and winning public support for their action. In
the end, the Hall case was a public relations victory for North Korea. Just as in the
Pueblo case, the North succeeded in publicly extracting diplomatically emba:rassing U.S.
16l Hubbard, Thornas, Former Depufy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Interview via
electronic correspondence by the author, 4 April 2005.
tu'Ibid.
tu' This analogy maybe an imperfect fit because there is new evidence that the Iranian students were acting
without the approval of the Ayotollah Khomeini and did not intend to provoke such a serious U.S.
diplomatic and (failed) military response (Bowden, Mark. "Among the Hostage-Takers." The Atlantic
Monthly 294, 5 (2004): 7 6-96).
47
McKay: U.S. Decision-making in the Korean Conflict
concessions; Commander-in-Chiefi United Nations Command, General Gary Luck, sent
an "official letter of regret" to the North Korean government.l6a
The Bush Administration: Learning the "Lessons" of 1994
Opponents of the 1994 Clinton strategy vis-ir-vis North Korea were hard at work
constructing the event as a constraining analogy to justify the multiparty approach to
nuclear talks with North Korea in 2002-2003. In other words, high-level bilateral talks
were out.l65 A favorite Pentagon cartoon shows President Clinton standing next to North
Korean leader Kim Jong-Il proclaiming the achievement of the 1994 Agreed Framework,
the latter standing next to a washing machine and holding the former's clothes in a large
pile (message: we were taken to the cleaners). President George W. Bush stated in the
second 2004 presidential debate: "It is naive and dangerous to take a policy that he
[Senator John Kerry] suggested the other day, which is to have bilateral relations with
North Korea...That's what President Clinton did. He had bilateral talks with the North
Koreans. And guess what happened? He [Kim Jong-Il] didn't honor the agreement. He
was enriching uranium. That is a bad policy."l66 In this view of senior U.S. policymakers
in the Departments of State and Defense, President Clinton is seen as the cheery and
diplomatically inept Neville Chamberlain, disembarking the airplane from Pyongyang
(Munich), waving the Agreed Framework (1938 agreement with Hitler), and proclaiming
a freeze to the graphite-moderated Yongbyon nuclear reactor ("peace in our time").167
ls Morris, 10.
r6s It should be noted that the idea of high-level bilateral talks originated in 1993 within the Office of the
Secretary Defense, not as a path to endless diplomacy, but as a way to push the crisis to a head.
t66 Commission on Presidential Debates, Transcript of Second Debate, 8 October 2004.
<htp ://www. debates. org/pages/trans2004c.html>
167 Select interviews conducted off the record by the author with senior U.S. officials, Department of State
and Office of the Secretary of Defense, I August - 3 September 2005; Policymakers are largely unaware of
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The intersection of the irrationality/twisted rationality narrative dating back to 1950 with
North Korea's nuclear ambitions has produced a sort of perfect storm of analogical
reasoning for the contemporary decision-making environment. The mutually reinforcing
"lessons" of Munich, the 1952-1953 armistice agreements, the Pueblo incident, and
Clinton's 1994 talks collectively evoke an America that has been repeatedly tricked into
acquiescence by a dangerous and unpredictable foe. In this light, North Korean nuclear
activity is seen as an act of "aggtession" and not merely as noncompliance with
international law. The primary historical analogy informing decision-making in the
2002-2003 crisis has been the "failure" of bilateral talks in 1994.
VII. CONCLUSION
Why study the Korean Conflict and, more specifically, why have I selected the three
historical moments detailed herein? Let us begin by laying out the range of factors that a
student of U.S. foreign relations might profitably investigate in an attempt to analyze a
particular policy outcome ex post facto. Among these factors we must include: the
bureaucratic structures through which power is exerted; the features of the international
system in which the state is an agent (polarity in the intemational system, for example),
the effect of historically informed analogies on their own decision-making, but they have an uncanny
ability to apply strategically the heuristic structues of analogical reasoning on the enemy. When Libyan
leader Moammar Gaddafi verifiably dismantled his weapons of mass destruction program in early 2004, the
Bush administration launched a diplomatic initiative designed to "teach" presumed and potential Non-
Proliferation Treaty violators the "lessons of (recent) history." When asked whether the "Libyan example"
was worth actively communicating to the North Korean regime as a "lesson of history," one assistant
secretary of state in the current Bush administration cautioned against stressing the Libyan nonproliferation
success story during negotiations with North Korea. "This is not an analogy they fNorth Korean leadership]
will make to our benefrt, because the Nodh Koreans view themselves as superior to all nations and view
Libya especially as contemptible...and won't follow their example." Another assistant secretary of state
responded "Yes, because it's a damn good example of what they can achieve if they choose to." Clearly,
policymakers are aware of analogical reasoning among their opponents - how other countries will interpret
the Libyan "lesson" is a subject of active in the nonproliferation community. Why they fail to take into full
account the potentially dangerous biases implicit in their own use of "lessons of the past" is somewhat less
clear.
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the economic, military, and diplomatic capacities of the state itself; and the outcome of a
crisis "game" with fixed "rules" observed by rational actors.168 In addition to some of the
broad, structural elements favored by political scientists, we must add the decision-
making environment itself: organizational-individual factors (roles, rules, agencies in the
foreign policy establishment), the intemal setting (cultural values, public opinion), and
situational properties (attributes particular to the event or problem itself;.16e I suggest that
historical memory is a constitutive part of the last category and a significant parl of the
internal setting of the decision-making process. Policymakers follow a sequence of
eventso (1) identifying and weighing the relevance of the issue in question, (2)
establishing policy alternatives, (3) choosing one among them, and (a) repeating the
process based on the consequences of their course of action.170
I also suggest that the selective use of historical memory (analogical reasoning) in the
process outlined above is more acute in time of crisis. In these often stressful situations,
the decision period is shorter; the search for information is less thorough than during the
normal course of events; the degree of urgency is high; and the decisions may be
irrevocable. We have seen how, in all three cases, overt value decisions were made at the
highest levels of organizational hierarchy. Snyder and Paige have suggested that the
decision to intervene in Korea in 1950 involved no more than fourteen individuals. all at
rut Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. Explaining and Understanding in International Relations. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1990. pp. I l9-23.
r6n Snyder, Richard C. and Glenn D. Paige. "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea:
The Application of an Analytical Scheme." In Snyder, Richard C., H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin.
Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. New York: Free
Press of Glencoe/Jvlacmillan, 19 62. p.212.
tto lbid. 213.
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the assistant secretary (for civilians) or service chief (for military) rank or higher.l7l
During crises, the effect of individual actors' preconceptions and cognitive processes on
the outcome of a policy is greatly magnified. Time is compressed, raising the possibility
that historical analogies might be applied "too mechanically," as Joseph Nye described
it.l72 There is little need to illustrate the importance of crises to international relations: the
Cuban Missile Crisis had profound and long-term implications for U.S.-Soviet relations;
the North's invasion of South Korea provided the first opportunity for the U.S. to test the
success of militarily counteracting perceived Soviet-directed aggression; the failure to
curb current North Korean nuclear ambitions has been described as significantly
weakening the integrity of the international non-proliferation regime. Thus, we might
conclude that policymakers' cognitive processes, especially their use of historical
memory to "know" the unknown, are of fundamental importance to the study of
international relations.
I have selected the Korean case in U.S. foreign relations because North Korea, as
historian Bruce Cumings vividly illustrates in North Korea: Another Country, represents
the ultimate "unknown" to lJ.S. policymakers, a country that operates largely outside the
boundaries of intemational society and whose actions are often described as irrational.lT3
Because accurate intelligence on North Korean intentions has been a serious problem
dating back to the Second World War, U.S. policymakers have been obliged to rely on
other their cognizance of past North Korean behavior in order to derive policy options
Itr rbid, 235.
tt' Ny", Joseph, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Interview via
electronic correspondence by the author, 4 April 2005.
tt' Cumings, Bruce. North Korea: Another Country. New York The New Press, 2004. pp.1-40.
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and make decisions. If we suppose that policymakers sometimes unconsciously reach for
"lessons of history" when confronting situations in which "objective" information is
scarce, then the Korea conflict, with all its uncertainties, ought to afford us a way of
testing out this assumption.
I return now to the early distinction between "objective" information and "personal"
information, supplied by the policymaker him/herself. The evidence we have examined
suggests that "personal information," particularly the attempt to learn from "lessons of
history," overshadowed the use of "objective" information during Truman's decision to
go to war and Johnson's deliberations on a response to the Pueblo. I have anived at this
conclusion based on the foct that we cannot fully account for the policy options that were
draftedfor consideration and the decisions undertaken based solely or even mostly on the
information available to policymakers at the time. Evidence of a Soviet-directed
stratagem designed to lead to wider war was scanty and fragmentary at best. Instead,
Truman saw the North's attack as "clearly another example of the aggressions of the
1930s."174 The Korean Conflict unfolded not as the result of a series of carefully
constructed alternatives, but rather as the implementation offacile recommendations that
flowedfrom an early definition of the situation according to the complementary scripts of
the 1930s and the Second World Wan In the case of the Pueblo, we have seen how
policymakers were actively reaching for some analytical framework that would provide
them with criteria for judging whether the crisis was an opportunity to show strength or
an entrapment scheme designed to divert U.S. troops and attention away from Vietnam.
In this case as well, "objective" information was severely limited - policymakers were
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unsure about forces acting upon the seemingly treacherous Pueblo Captain Bucher and
the Soviet's hand in the matter was ambiguous at best. The record indicates that the
White House meeting participants grappled with the potential reactions of the Soviets,
Chinese, North Koreans, and wider intemational community with equal unease. In this
light, the group's decision to demonstrate resoluteness by sending B-52 bombers to South
Korea appea"rs to stem from a desire to follow the script of an incident that weighed
heavily on their minds - the Cuban missile crisis, in which the Soviets "responded
negatively to a show of force."
A Last lilord on Rationality
At the very least, the evidence from U.S. decision-making in the Korean case complicates
our assumptions regarding the supposed rationality of the state and the individual actors
who conduct its external affairs. Lrternational relations theorists and historians of U.S.
foreign relations are both sometimes guilty of writing about the decision-making process,
ex post facto, in a way that subordinates the participants thought capacity to the course of
events that actually took place. Looking back on a given historical moment or a sequence
of interconnected moments, we are drawn to assign actors a level of rationality that
cannot be effectively be refuted because the world is not a laboratory in which readers
can "repeat the experiment" for themselves to see whether they come up with the same
conclusions. We cannot easily distinguish between the emotional and the rational in
analyzing the decision-making process. "Rational" decisions, supposedly rendered based
on the pursuit of objectively-defined interests, are often upon closer inspection the
product of individual actors' interpretation of language according to their own
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